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Abstract 
The absence of formal state structures for the conduct of cultural relations until 1938 has led 
to the assumption that Americans abandoned a noble tradition of liberal cultural exchange in 
the Cold War, when state and private organizations co-operated in a propaganda battle against 
the Soviet Union. This article re-examines the realities of American cultural diplomacy in 
inter-war Europe by focusing on a group of key actors: philanthropic foundations founded by 
the Rockefeller and the Carnegie families. Far from being apolitical, foundations operated 
with the tacit approval of the state and reliably furthered American interests abroad but their 
nongovernmental status also made them vulnerable to foreign intelligence. 
 
 
 
‘Winning hearts and minds’; ‘cultural imperialism’; ‘a specialised form of statecraft, 
concerned with information and value transmission’; or simply ‘goodwill stuff’ – these are all 
more or less accurate definitions of cultural diplomacy, an area of foreign relations that is 
currently receiving much attention.
1
 When talking about American cultural diplomacy, our 
thinking almost inevitably turns to the so-called Cultural Cold War. For many historians, the 
most salient episode here remains the rise and fall of the Congress for Cultural Freedom in the 
nineteen-fifties and sixties. Sustained by such intellectual luminaries as Stephen Spender, 
Melvin Lasky and Raymond Aron, the congress was publicly supported by the Ford 
Foundation but at the same time covertly financed by the C.I.A. As is well known, the 
congress underwrote a large number of organizations in various countries, published the 
influential magazine Encounter and provided a forum for centrist, sometimes left-leaning but 
always staunchly anti-communist intellectuals. The exposure of covert C.I.A. funding in 1967 
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caused a public outcry, tarnished the Ford Foundation’s reputation and ultimately led to the 
demise of the congress.
2
 
Those writing on the Congress for Cultural Freedom generally fall into two camps. 
Some claim that these scholars and intellectuals who accepted American funding had a large 
degree of autonomy in what they thought and wrote. The C.I.A. may have paid for 
publications and plush international conferences but that did not mean that it was able 
completely to control cultural messages.
3
 Moreover, as Volker Berghahn has argued, the 
position of the Ford Foundation was more ambiguous: its president became increasingly 
uncomfortable about giving a grant to a covertly funded organization and the foundation itself 
never agreed to act as a financial channel for the C.I.A.
4
 
Others writing on the Congress for Cultural Freedom have taken a completely 
different line. They argue that the Ford Foundation willingly co-operated with the C.I.A. for 
propaganda purposes and helped it to influence public debate in post-war western Europe. As 
the Cold War was waged on all fronts, so this argument goes, foundations and the American 
government alike disregarded the ideal of intellectual freedom – which is what they were 
supposed to be fighting for in the first place. Even if the aim was to oppose the ‘un-freedom’ 
of the Soviet Union, and to revive democracy in western Europe, surely the means – covert 
funding channels and conspiracy – were deeply flawed. As Frances Stonor Saunders, author 
of the programmatically-titled study Who Paid the Piper?, asks: ‘To what degree was it 
admissible for another state to covertly intervene in the fundamental processes of organic 
intellectual growth, of free debate and the uninhibited flow of ideas?’5 How could the 
American government, aided by civil society organizations, take these measures that 
undermined freedom instead of defending it? 
The answer to that question is commonly held to lie in the way that American cultural 
diplomacy developed before and after the Second World War. Like Stonor Saunders, 
historians of American cultural diplomacy frame their narratives around an opposition 
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between those cultural relations which are promoted by private groups, such as philanthropic 
foundations, and those promoted by the state. Free-flowing, organic intellectual processes are 
juxtaposed against state control and indoctrination. Private, civil society-based efforts are held 
to be idealistic, non-political, based on mutual exchange and respect whereas state-led cultural 
efforts are seen to have a tendency to be one-directional, concerned with short-term objectives 
and exclusively promoting the national interest. Frank Ninkovich, whose Diplomacy of Ideas 
remains the  standard work on the development of American cultural diplomacy from the late 
nineteen-thirties, tells just such a story: in the nineteen-twenties, cultural relations between the 
United States and the rest of the world were dominated by civil society groups. These 
included academic associations, for example the American Library Association or the 
American Council of Learned Societies, but most importantly a number of privately-funded 
philanthropic foundations, notably the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the 
Rockefeller Foundation, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial and the Carnegie 
Corporation.
6
 The foundations provided the financial backing for projects initiated by the 
academic associations, and increased scholarly mobility. Thus, these philanthropic 
foundations created what Ninkovich calls a ‘private institutional system for the conduct of 
cultural relations’, largely aimed at an academic elite.7 
This private, non-political, voluntarist system distinguished the United States from 
European countries that embraced, according to Ninkovich, a completely different model, 
namely, Kulturpolitik, culture in the service of power politics.
8
 This assessment is to some 
extent correct since the United States was indeed a relative latecomer in terms of establishing 
a formal infrastructure for the conduct of cultural diplomacy. The French Service des Œuvres 
Françaises à l’Etranger and the Kulturabteilung of the German Foreign Ministry, for 
example, were both established in 1920.
9
 Even in Britain, where voluntarist traditions were 
strong, the Foreign Office set up the British Council in 1934 and engaged it in, according to 
Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon, ‘the finest form of counter propaganda’.10 
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The American State Department, however, only set up its Division of Cultural 
Relations in July 1938, mainly as a reaction to Axis cultural propaganda in Latin America. 
Nevertheless, for the next ten years, the newly created division held up the voluntarist 
traditions of the private cultural relations establishment. However, in the course of the Second 
World War, and as international politics became realigned into the bipolar power structures of 
the Cold War, the United States adopted a ‘European-style’ – Kulturpolitik which ultimately 
led to the hypocrisies of the Cultural Cold War. By 1950, American cultural diplomacy had 
moved from internationalism to nationalism and from private to public. It had turned 
international organizations like U.N.E.S.C.O. into a mouthpiece for American policies. 
Finally, it mobilized independent liberal thinkers for the ideological combat against 
communism. Intellectual relations became politicized and thus poisoned and the noble 
American tradition of free cultural exchange was lost.
11
 
This is the standard account, which, however, betrays its Cold War vantage point. It 
implies that all those American groups involved in cultural relations before 1938 were really 
very good internationalists and part of an authentic, free-flowing, cross-cultural exchange into 
which politics rarely intruded. This, according to Ninkovich, changed because totalitarian 
regimes forced the United States to embrace European-style cultural policies. By framing the 
debate in this way, Ninkovich idealizes the unofficial conduct of cultural relations that went 
on in the inter-war years and leads us towards some intriguing conclusions. 
First, Ninkovich seems to imply that private cultural diplomacy, run by non-
governmental organizations, is non-political and somehow possesses more democratic 
legitimacy than cultural diplomacy forged by states. Second, he also imagines a European 
tradition of Kulturpolitik which is supposedly completely different from the American 
approach. Apart from the fact that Ninkovich’s characterization of European cultural foreign 
policies is problematic – private groups within the educated bourgeoisie were often at the 
origin of state policies, in Europe as in the United States
12
 – one wonders how the supposedly 
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voluntarist American approach could have worked if it used the same channels as European 
state-led organizations. At a basic level, we should challenge the notion that because of the 
late onset of the governmental management of international cultural relations in the United 
States ‘The US was a newcomer to culture wars’ in the Cold War, as Tony Judt has claimed.13 
Thus, it seems necessary to have a closer look at American cultural relations in the 
inter-war years. Whether we can label these various initiatives and groups as ‘cultural 
diplomacy’ is up for discussion. Is something only worthy of the label diplomacy if state 
bureaucrats are directly involved? Or is it more valuable to analyse how cultural programmes 
actually worked on the ground, and how they were received in other countries? Is the public-
private distinction really so important? Can the ‘non-political, private’ status of certain 
organizations not be part and parcel of official foreign policy? This article will explore these 
questions by focusing on two prominent philanthropic foundations, the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace and the Rockefeller Foundation, the major financiers and bridge-
builders in the American private cultural relations elite of the inter-war years. It will analyse, 
first, the rather porous border between state and private in inter-war American cultural 
relations; second, the values promoted by the foundations in Europe and some of their 
projects; and third, the way American foundations interacted with intergovernmental and state 
structures. 
 
 
Let us start with a few explanatory notes on the foundations. Both the Carnegie Endowment 
and the Rockefeller Foundation, established in 1910 and 1913 respectively, are examples of 
the large corporate foundations set up during the progressive era by a number of wealthy 
families.
14
 The Carnegie Endowment was originally rooted in the pre-1914 transatlantic peace 
movement.
15
 The Rockefeller Foundation started out with large-scale programmes in public 
health, initially in the Americas and Asia. In the course of the First World War, these were 
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extended into Europe, where the foundation then started to aid academic research in the 
natural and medical sciences.
16
 The social sciences, initially under the smaller Laura Spelman 
Rockefeller Memorial also received substantial funding.
17
 
Officers in both foundations viewed their activity as instrumental in the construction 
of a stable and peaceful world order. They also held that academic research should ultimately 
underpin political decisions. Foundations had presided over the increase in expert-led 
policymaking in the domestic arena, which was a response to the progressive preoccupation 
with efficiency and good governance – foreign policy was one of the last borders for outside 
expertise.
18
 In Europe and the United States, the foundations promoted the involvement of 
private citizens in the broader foreign policymaking process in two ways. First, they gave 
support to institutions that conducted research or teaching in subjects that were relevant to 
foreign policy, such as history, economics, geography and international law. Some of them 
were part of national systems of higher education, for example the London School of 
Economics (L.S.E.). Others were private ‘foreign affairs institutes’. These included the 
Institut für Auswärtige Politik in Hamburg, the American Council on Foreign Relations and 
Chatham House in London. A third category comprised institutions that primarily trained 
future diplomats, such as the Ecole des Hautes Etudes Internationales at the University of 
Paris.
19
 Second, the foundations promoted the international mobility of scholars. The 
Rockefeller philanthropies financed an extensive fellowship programme.
20
 The Carnegie 
Endowment also awarded fellowships and established two chairs for visiting lecturers, one in 
Paris and one in Berlin, and considered establishing more such ‘Carnegie Chairs’ in several 
European capitals.
21
 Finally, the foundations supported institutions that were self-consciously 
‘international’. The most prominent example here is the Graduate Institute of International 
Studies in Geneva, which was founded with a substantial Rockefeller grant. It had an 
international staff – usually including at least one visiting American professor.22 The Carnegie 
Endowment, on the other hand, funded the Academy of International Law at the Hague.
23
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 But what was the relation of the foundations to American foreign policies? Even 
before the First World War, the programmes of the Carnegie Endowment and the Rockefeller 
Foundation both supplemented official U.S. foreign policy. The Carnegie Endowment 
embraced a rather legalistic approach to international relations, being led by international 
lawyers and elder statesmen such as its first president Elihu Root. One of its major projects 
was the ongoing development and popularization of international law.
24
 This fitted in with the 
American government’s championing of international law between 1898 and 1922. A 
legalistic approach to international affairs and a growing acceptance of international law 
among European states suited traditional U.S. foreign policy aims towards Europe, which 
called for isolation in peace and neutrality in war.
25
 The early geographical focus of 
Rockefeller philanthropy overlapped with American expansion in the western hemisphere 
where the American military conducted several sanitary campaigns between the eighteen-
nineties and the nineteen-tens. Rockefeller campaigns in these areas also relied on personnel 
recruited among former military and colonial officials. Similar to those of the Carnegie 
Endowment, the Rockefeller activities dovetailed with American foreign policy objectives.
26
 
The Great War changed the environment in which the foundations operated. The 
outcome of the conflict transformed the global balance of power and, with the establishment 
of the League of Nations, the international system as such. Historians of social reform 
movements have seen the Great War as the beginning of the end of unchallenged European 
leadership in setting the social policy agenda in the north Atlantic. Transatlantic exchanges 
became less one-sided as Fordism and other elements of the American ‘machine civilization’ 
travelled eastwards.
27
 The American relief workers who tested progressive models in town-
planning, public health and education on war-devastated French civilians were the harbingers 
of this role reversal.
28
 Foundations were major financiers of American war relief in Europe, 
co-ordinated by semi-governmental organizations such as the American Red Cross or the 
American Relief Administration. The Rockefeller Foundation even created its own War 
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Relief Commission and provided over $19 million to humanitarian and war-related initiatives 
between 1914 and 1918.
29
 The Carnegie Endowment also made contributions to war relief 
but, most importantly, offered the services of its International Law Division to the State 
Department during the war and compiled studies in preparation for the Paris Peace 
Conference.
30
 
Many staff members of the foundations served as expert advisers to government 
agencies during the war or went to the Paris Peace Conference. They include James Brown 
Scott, George A. Finch and James T. Shotwell of the Carnegie Endowment and Raymond 
Fosdick, future president of the Rockefeller Foundation, who was a civilian aide to General 
Pershing. Future foundation officers assumed important roles in the war administration at 
home and abroad, for instance on the Creel Committee, the Inquiry or the Commission for 
Training Camp Activities. But they also collected experiences with the semi-official agencies 
that became so prominent during the war. Tracy B. Kittredge, for example, the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s assistant director of the Social Sciences Division in the nineteen-thirties, worked 
for Hoover’s Relief Commission in Belgium.31 Thus, many later foundation employees served 
their country either as expert advisers or in a semi-official capacity. In fact, it is hard to find 
foundation staff of this generation without such a war record. Considering the wartime roles 
of philanthropic leaders, it is clear that their experiences brought them into closer contact with 
foreign policymakers. Those involved in the peacemaking process, in particular, realized the 
extent to which government was willing to rely on outside expertise. Finally, philanthropic 
leaders now increasingly emphasized that the fulfilment of American foreign policy 
objectives was a prerequisite to universalist philanthropic aims such as world peace. Patriotic 
duty had to come before internationalist duty – or, as John D. Rockefeller, Jr. insisted, there 
were cases ‘where Brotherhood must halt until Right Prevails’.32 
Of course the end of the Great War saw the rapid abolition of all the wartime agencies 
that many foundation staff had worked for. Moreover, the United States did not become a 
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member of the League of Nations, a state of affairs which especially frustrated Raymond 
Fosdick, a protégé of Woodrow Wilson and briefly under-secretary-general of the league.
33
 
Nevertheless, throughout the nineteen-twenties and thirties, the philanthropic elite of the 
Carnegie and Rockefeller foundations retained a certain closeness to officials in the State 
Department, and in American embassies abroad. There was no direction of foundation 
policies but there were certainly informal consultations without directions.
34
 Sometimes, the 
relationship between diplomats and foundations was marked by ambivalence, as foundation 
staff were unsure whether having the official backing of their government would be an asset 
or a liability abroad. The following letter of 1922 from George E. Vincent, then president of 
the Rockefeller Foundation, to Alanson B. Houghton, U.S. ambassador to Germany, 
illustrates this dilemma:  
We desire to avoid undue publicity. We work with many countries and it is our policy to keep the 
Foundation and its personnel in the background. It would seriously interfere with our work if it were 
regarded as a form of nationalistic propaganda. We shall count, therefore, upon your co-operation in 
helping us to avoid anything which might seem to involve us in international politics or might prove 
embarrassing to our work throughout the world.
35
 
In effect, in this letter Vincent asked for governmental co-operation to produce the appearance 
of non-co-operation. The unspoken assumption was that some level of state-private co-
ordination was expected but should be denied publicly. This is underlined by Vincent’s 
promise to keep Houghton informed: ‘Our representatives when they go to Berlin will make a 
point of calling upon you and letting you know how things are going.’36  
Not all foundation officers were so cautious, notably Nicholas Murray Butler, the 
president of the Carnegie Endowment from 1925. His ventures into European capitals, often 
connected with a sumptuous banquet in his honour and a lengthy speech, came dangerously 
close to private diplomacy and American diplomats shuddered whenever he embarked on one 
of his annual sojourns. S. Pinkney Tuck, from the American legation in Budapest, recalls a 
1931 visit of Butler’s to receive honorary degrees from the universities of Budapest and 
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Szeged. Butler delivered two public addresses, greeted by apprehension from the American 
diplomat: ‘for both subjects he selected were capable of interpretation and development along 
lines which might render my official presence distinctly embarrassing.’ Thankfully, Butler’s 
speeches were vetted by the organizers of the trip and did not cause a diplomatic éclat. To 
Tuck’s relief, neither did they cause too much publicity in Hungary: ‘The local press 
contented itself with brief but flattering comments on Dr. Butler’s position in public life in the 
United States and the real pleasure with which the Hungarian Government welcomed him to 
Budapest.’37 In Hungary, Butler was seen as a representative of the American political 
establishment. He was there in a private capacity but his speeches contained the potential for 
diplomatic ruptures, at least in the opinion of the American legation. 
Nevertheless, no American foundation representative was ever threatened with being 
charged under the Logan Act, which prohibits private citizens from conducting American 
foreign policy. This had almost happened to Herbert Hoover, for his food distribution 
programme in the aftermath of the First World War.
38
 The Rockefeller and the Carnegie 
Endowment were cautious enough to steer clear of such dangers and the Rockefeller 
Foundation in particular succeeded in carefully cultivating an image of impartiality and 
independence in its dealings abroad – with the approval of the American State Department. 
 
 
What were the attitudes of the foundations towards Europe? What were they hoping to 
achieve through their expensive programmes and how did they go about it? One chief feature 
of inter-war foundation policy is that it was relatively decentralized. Both the Rockefeller 
Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment maintained European branch offices in Paris which 
had considerable autonomy, both in terms of policy and grant-making. These offices were an 
integral part of the large American community in Paris – in the voice of an ex-pat: ‘We have 
American bars in Paris, an American Hospital in Paris, American Jazz-Bands, American 
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Newspapers, American Crooks, Philanthropists, Barbers, Dentists, Doctors, and American 
Undertakers in Paris.’39 The Carnegie Endowment’s European office had some French staff 
and its in-house journal, L’Esprit International, was also regarded as a French publication, 
edited by the young Pierre Renouvin. L’Esprit International offered mostly articles on current 
affairs, international law and European federation. Its editorial line was liberal and anti-
communist, its authors were well-known public intellectuals, such as Butler himself, Count 
Carlo Sforza, William Rappard, and the occasional monarchist.
40
 The directors of the 
Carnegie Endowment’s European office aimed to turn the journal into ‘one of the leaders of 
public opinion in international tasks and problems in all European Countries’, a European 
version of Foreign Affairs.
41
 The Rockefeller Foundation did not engage in such publicity 
activities. Its European branch office was staffed almost exclusively by Americans but it kept 
its grant-giving policies decentralized by employing national fellowship advisers, or 
committees of advisers.
42
 These personnel pre-selected candidates for fellowships and 
commented on institutional grant applications. American foundations appreciated the local 
intellectual capital that they were able to tap into for their European operations, and rewarded 
their foreign collaborators with generous invitations to the United States.
43
 
In general, American foundation officers had much respect for European scholarship 
and also for European culture. Unlike later Cold Warriors who tried to counter European 
cultural anti-Americanism by emphasizing the value of American achievements such as jazz, 
the foundations were more interested in transferring American scientific advances across the 
Atlantic.
44
 In cultural terms, they were less self-confident. Raymond Fosdick, for example, 
suffered from a cultural inferiority complex well into the nineteen-twenties. Quoting André 
Siegfried, a French observer of American civilization, Fosdick diagnosed a worrying level of 
intellectual, cultural and artistic impoverishment in his homeland.
45
 
What American foundation representatives were confident about, however, were their 
political institutions and their moral superiority. As Nicholas Murray Butler put it in 1914, the 
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Great War had confirmed the United States’ ‘right to be appealed to on questions of national 
and international morality’. Butler also suggested that Europe adopt the American principle of 
federation.
46
 The federal structure of the United States was for many foundation officers 
something that would inevitably spread to the rest of the world. Reminding Americans of how 
long it took to consolidate federal authority in the United States, Raymond Fosdick concluded 
that ‘The League of Nations must [now] inevitably go through the same process’.47 In the 
Cold War, this emphasis shifted to the creation of an Atlantic community of norms and 
values, but in the inter-war years, American foundation officers were advocates of a European 
regionalism. Remarkably, the movement for European integration in Europe itself was very 
receptive to their ideas. Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, the aristocratic leader of the small but 
influential Pan-European Union, wrote in his 1925 book Pan-Europe – Nicholas Murray 
Butler provided the preface to the American edition – that the United States was really at the 
vanguard for peaceful federation and that Europe should follow: ‘It is characteristic that the 
part of the world which is technically the most advanced – America – was likewise the first to 
try the new method of political organization: namely, a system of peaceful federations, 
culminating in the Pan-American Union and in the idea of a League of Nations’.48 
The idea that technological advances would have a role to play in new schemes for 
world organization was also shared among foundation officers, and lay at the root of their 
strong support for the social sciences. Raymond Fosdick, for example, had been convinced by 
his wartime experience that, while humanity had the technological capacity for immense 
destruction, it lacked the social tools to deal with these scientific advances: ‘This divergence 
between the natural sciences and the social sciences, between machinery and control …  this 
is where the hazard lies’.49 In Fosdick’s opinion, modern life was adversely affected by an 
antiquated form of social organization. Optimism about the applicability of social scientific 
knowledge and the potential for the scientific planning of societal developments was common 
in American academia at the time.
50
 The nineteen-twenties were boom years for the social 
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sciences and American foundation officers were keen to spread American knowledge and 
methods to Europe. 
However, they also expected that supporting more research in the social sciences in 
Europe itself would help Europeans to see the light. Abraham Flexner, another influential 
voice within the Rockefeller philanthropies, hoped that such research would be conducive to  
[SMALL TYPE FULL OUT]the improvement of economic conditions in Europe … Suppose, however, 
that by comparative study and actual experiment Europe can be led to see that through economic and 
other policies which disregard political boundaries, hitherto largely the cause and consequence of war, it 
will be helped out of its present economic and social distress.
51
 
The Carnegie Endowment, even though it still advocated principally the development of 
international law, also started to rely on the social sciences by commissioning the 132-volume 
Economic and Social History of the World War. This represented an acknowledgment that 
social scientific knowledge would play a role in the development of peaceful international 
relations.
52
 
In the mind of Beardsley Ruml, director of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, 
a ‘cross-fertilization of ideas’ between the United States and Europe was called for and 
‘effective steps should be taken to secure that in London at least and also if possible in two or 
more cities on the European continent there shall be a thoroughly representative collection of 
American books, periodicals and other publications in the field of social science.’53 
Accordingly, early Rockefeller social science programmes in nineteen-twenties Europe 
concentrated on the provision of scientific literature and of specialist libraries. A host of 
academic libraries received large amounts of funds – notably that of the L.S.E.54 The Carnegie 
Endowment rebuilt libraries destroyed in the war, for example in Louvain and in Belgrade.
55
  
There were also instances where the foundations co-operated with the foreign 
activities of the American Library Association. The American Library in Paris was such a 
case in point. It had been founded during the Great War by an American volunteer group, the 
American Committee for Devastated France. It served as the headquarters for the Library War 
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Service with the American Expeditionary Forces and was converted to a permanent institution 
in 1920.
56
 Apart from offering American books to interested readers, the library also ran a 
school for those who wanted to learn about American methods of librarianship. The school’s 
student body comprised twenty-three different nationalities and in a letter of the library to its 
American constituents, the potential impact of this spreading of American librarianship was 
highlighted: 
[SMALL TYPE FULL OUT]In art, in literature, in drama, America has followed foreign models; in 
formal education she has built on Continental systems; but in library service the nations of the world are 
looking to America for leadership. Because of this, public library service has come to be regarded as a 
prime factor in the establishment of international harmony.
57
 
In the mid nineteen-twenties, the Carnegie Endowment planned to integrate its own 
operations with that of the library, and to transform it into a major cultural centre for 
American culture on the Left Bank, which would be, according to Earle Babcock, head of the 
Endowment’s European office and president of the library’s board, ‘a focal point for the 
spread of American cultural influence not only in France but throughout Europe’.58 In its own 
pamphlets, the library used the softer language of goodwill and mutual understanding between 
nations, describing its purpose as follows: ‘to assist towards a better understanding of 
American life, literature, and habits of thought and to promote mutual comprehension and 
good-will.’ The fact that it was privately-run also received a special mention: ‘The money 
necessary to maintain the Service comes for the most part from individual Americans who are 
desirous of assisting in promoting international understanding and believe this to be the most 
effective way of doing it.’59 
As a result of a lack of funds, the Carnegie Endowment’s plans for the library were 
shelved but the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial supported it on a smaller scale from 
1923. The feature in which the memorial was most interested was the library’s Research 
Service on International Affairs. This reference service published a journal, the European 
Economic and Political Survey. On its list of subscribers were various American banks, 
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universities and embassies, but also institutions like the L.S.E. and the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs.
60
 However, because of internal squabbles, the library declined 
throughout the nineteen-twenties. The memorial started to doubt whether it had enough local 
support and made its grants dependent on the library’s ability to raise local funds. This 
practice was extensively commented on in the French press, which identified the Laura 
Spelman Rockefeller Memorial with John D. Rockefeller, Sr. himself, the ‘Napoléon du 
petrole’ – even though he was not involved in the running of the foundation at all. ‘His maxim 
that only those who can help themselves are worthy of aid’, L’Impartial Français wrote in 
1927, ‘is extremely representative of the American character. For him, generosity has to 
generate a certain energy’.61 Thus, the American library shaped the image which Europeans 
had of the United States, not just with the reading materials offered on its shelves, but also 
through the way it was funded. The construction of American foundation philanthropy as an 
activity sustained by individual generosity and spontaneous enterprise – and not the 
professional staff and complex bureaucratic structures which, in reality, were essential to the 
running of most foundations – was not uncommon in Europe, and certainly not actively 
contradicted by the foundations themselves. Nevertheless, despite several desperate appeals 
the American Library in Paris lost its Rockefeller funding in the mid nineteen-thirties, partly 
because a lot of the American community had left Paris by then.
62
 
The interest of American foundations in libraries did not just revolve around the kind 
of knowledge that such repositories would provide to European readers but also around the 
way knowledge was stored, organized and displayed.
63
 The problem with American library 
methods, notably the system of open stacks, however, was that it was much more costly than 
European alternatives. It was for this reason that the League of Nations, which had had an 
American library since its foundation, was compelled to reconsider this arrangement and to 
sack its librarian, Florence Wilson, in 1926. Florence Wilson had also attended the Paris 
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Peace Conference of 1919, where she organized the archive of the American delegation, and 
ended up in Geneva after that.
64
 
Again, American foundations, notably the Carnegie Corporation and the Laura 
Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, were called to the rescue, this time by Arthur Sweetser, an 
American friend of Raymond Fosdick and member of the league’s Information Section. 
Sweetser warned of  
[SMALL TYPE FULL OUT]terminat[ing] the American Library System in this central point of world 
diplomacy … You could not buy the demonstration value of this installation for thousands of dollars. It 
threw our system of open shelves, cheery surroundings, and efficient service before the eyes of 
diplomats, scholars and journalists from all countries.
65
 
Despite the United States’ non-membership in the league, Sweetser felt that in this matter ‘We 
want the right to vote. We have not that right at present and don’t deserve it. But, if we put 
something into the Library, it would be accorded to us as gladly as in matters of health it is 
accorded to the Rockefeller Foundation’.66 Sweetser alluded, of course, to the large 
contributions that the Rockefeller Foundation made to the league’s Health Organization. As 
for the league library, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial did indeed support it with a 
grant of $30,000 which was, however, channelled through the American Library Association. 
The memorial’s name was not to be mentioned. 67 Apparently, a professional association of 
librarians was deemed to be the most appropriate sponsor for the League of Nations Library. 
This was not the first time that the American Library Association had channelled Rockefeller 
funds to Europe
68
 – the advantage of this was that the money only showed up as a grant to an 
American professional organization in the memorial’s annual report and not as a grant to the 
league, which could have stirred up controversy at home. The obscuring of the exact 
provenance of grants was therefore not a Cold War phenomenon, though admittedly the 
memorial was not quite the C.I.A. The practice as such, however, was well established. 
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The last part of this article will focus on the functions that foundations assumed in an 
international context. This means evaluating their relationship with the League of Nations as 
well as their dealings with foreign governments. Finally, it will comment briefly on the most 
overtly political work of the foundations in the nineteen-thirties, the International Studies 
Conference.  
The League of Nations, where most of the international collaboration between 
technical experts was taking place in the inter-war years, was not surprisingly a focus for 
much of the work of the foundations. It is not an exaggeration to say that through the 
cooperation of foundations and private American initiatives there was an American presence 
in Geneva that amounted to quasi-membership, at least with regards to technical 
collaboration. In the nineteen-thirties, as governmental contributions to the League of Nations 
dwindled, American foundations increasingly became important donors to the league, and 
succeeded in ensuring that Americans had a part in the creation of international norms and 
standards which, as league historians such as Susan Pedersen claim, was a crucial and lasting 
outcome of the league’s existence.69 The large contributions of the Rockefeller Foundation to 
the league’s health work and its Financial Section complemented numerous personal gifts of 
the Rockefeller family.
70
 The founding of the Graduate Institute of International Studies in 
Geneva with a Rockefeller grant can be interpreted as the creation of a university for the 
league. The smaller Geneva Research Center, funded by both philanthropies from 1930, was 
mainly designed to provide Americans with information about the world organization, 
although it also served as a personal research service for officers of the Carnegie Endowment 
in its early years.
71
 Finally, Rockefeller and Carnegie money also financed the American 
National Committee on Intellectual Co-operation which was affiliated with the Geneva-based 
International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation and the International Institute of 
Intellectual Co-operation in Paris (the precursor of today’s U.N.E.S.C.O.).72 The American 
National Committee was fully integrated in the league apparatus of technical co-operation. It 
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had considerable influence and successfully pushed the Committee on Intellectual Co-
operation to give increased prominence to the social and political sciences from the early 
nineteen-thirties.
73
 The league bodies concerned with intellectual co-operation were keen to 
work with American philanthropists. In his dealings with the Carnegie Endowment, Julien 
Luchaire, head of the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, played down the 
intergovernmental underpinnings of his institute and maintained that it did not matter whether 
participating organizations came from member countries of the League of Nations or not. 
‘Our coordinating operations’, Luchaire explained, ‘do not take place between governments 
but between interested institutions and milieux in all countries’.74  
Foreign diplomats completely recognized that American foundations were the crucial 
players in cultural relations between the United States and the rest of the world. As such they 
had the potential to become partners of foreign governments that intended to generate 
goodwill for their own country in the United States. In the case of Germany, this was 
recognized from the mid nineteen-twenties. Information about the foundations was passed on 
to the Foreign Ministry by German members of the philanthropic network. A report on the 
Rockefeller Foundation found in the personal papers of the head of the semi-governmental 
Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft (Emergency Association for German Science) 
includes detailed biographical information on all those trustees of the foundation who were 
‘kulturpolitisch bedeutsam’ – relevant in terms of cultural diplomacy. The report specifies 
where they had studied (very often in Germany), whether they had held government office, 
whether they were influential in the American press, and who their spouses and friends 
were.
75
 This information was most likely also known to the German Foreign Ministry’s 
Kulturabteilung, which regularly conferred with foundation fellowship advisers.
76
 There were 
several instances when German government bureaucrats used philanthropic networks for their 
own advantage, including effective government censorship of volumes which were written for 
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the Carnegie history of the world war
77
 as well as the successful removal of German pacifists 
from the Carnegie Endowment’s European organization.  
The reports on clandestine German rearmament written by one of them, Friedrich 
Wilhelm Foerster, to the Endowment’s trustees in the United States had, in particular, been 
noticed in a negative way by a German diplomat posted in Washington, who complained 
about their impact: ‘You cannot imagine the effect of these reports. One carries them to the 
President, to Congress, to the Administration and takes them to be the gospel.’78 Thus, it was 
in Germany’s interest to nudge Foerster out of the Carnegie network, so that the endowment’s 
links could be more fruitfully used for Germany’s own cultural diplomacy. The German 
government did not protest officially against the endowment’s activities in Germany – that 
would have been counterproductive. Instead, it successfully sought to convince Nicholas 
Murray Butler in personal meetings and through the endowment’s German representative that 
there was no room for overly critical foreign members in his organization. After all, he 
wanted to have cordial relations with government circles and the Great and the Good of 
Europe in general.
79
 This strategy worked.
80
 The Rockefeller Foundation, with its stronger 
emphasis on academic research, was not as susceptible to such manipulations, but in the field 
of international relations, one of its main programmes in the nineteen-thirties, its ambitions to 
forge a transnational academic consensus on certain international problems were also 
frustrated. 
In the nineteen-thirties, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace gave considerable financial support to the International Studies 
Conference, a series of annual conferences on international affairs under the auspices of the 
League of Nations’ International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation.81 They provided an 
international forum for the contemporary intellectual elite involved in international studies. 
Delegates included Alfred Zimmern, Arnold Wolfers, Arnold Toynbee and E. H. Carr. There 
were also quite a few liberal economists, some of whom later founded the Mont Pèlerin 
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Society;
82
 and there were some whose political careers still largely lay ahead of them, for 
example the future secretary of state John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles, of C.I.A. fame and 
one of the main protagonists of the Cultural Cold War.
83
  
There were also delegates from the dictatorships that left the league in the course of 
the nineteen-thirties – Germany, Italy and Japan. Thus, it would be accurate to describe the 
International Studies Conference as a major site of the intellectual battle between the liberal 
democracies and the dictatorships. One of the most vocal participants in this struggle was a 
German delegate, an international lawyer called Fritz Berber. Berber worked for the 
Dienststelle Ribbentrop, the liaison office between the German Foreign Ministry and Hitler, 
and headed a Nazi foreign affairs brain trust.
84
 In fact, there is evidence in German archives 
that Ribbentrop specifically sent Berber to the conferences and to preparatory meetings to use 
them as a propaganda platform.
85
 The American foundations not only accepted Berber’s 
presence at the International Studies Conferences, some of their officers actively encouraged 
it in a misguided attempt to strengthen so-called ‘moderate elements’ in Germany.86 
As for the conferences themselves, under the direction of the foundations they were 
completely transformed between 1928 and 1931 from an annual meeting where academics 
discussed mostly technical matters, into para-diplomatic conferences with a common theme, 
designed to ‘focus the attention of the various governments of Europe’, as one Rockefeller 
officer remarked.
87
 For the Rockefeller Foundation this also represented an opportunity to 
institutionalize research networks between the foreign affairs institutes it had started to 
support in the nineteen-twenties. The foundation intervened in numerous ways in the running 
of the International Studies Conference, wresting control away from the institute in Paris and 
thereby weakening the intergovernmental foundations of the conference. The intention behind 
this was to convene a pan-European body of experts which could also include scholars from 
states that had withdrawn from the league. In reality, though, scholars from dictatorships, such 
as Berber, found it easy to penetrate these nongovernmental structures – he simply posed as a 
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private scholar even though in reality he was a Nazi spy.
88
 After the fall of France, Berber was 
put in charge of the International Institute for Intellectual Co-operation in Paris, where he 
presided over the theft and subsequent transfer to Germany of many of the institute’s files 
relating to the International Studies Conference.
89
 
 
 
When it came to cultural relations, American foundations wanted to have their cake and eat it. 
They benefited from the comparative flexibility, nimbleness and prestige that international 
nongovernmental organizations were able to claim for themselves but they also enjoyed the 
honours that came with being de facto in charge of American cultural diplomacy. The salient 
example here is Nicholas Murray Butler who rather relished being treated like an American 
cultural attaché all over Europe. It is undeniable, though, that the foundations’ ambiguous 
position made them vulnerable targets for the cultural diplomacy or intelligence work of other 
countries. Were the foundations really paragons of a fine American tradition of free-flowing 
cultural exchange? This is questionable. Foundations had political ambitions and also 
interfered with so-called authentic national cultures, though, it must be admitted, with the 
frequent result of strengthening liberal forces. Their dealings, however, were not always 
completely transparent and they also channelled funds through other organizations. 
Ultimately, American foundations in the inter-war years aspired to achieve what any 
practitioner of cultural diplomacy during that time purported to do: spreading the 
achievements of their own civilization for the benefit of the world. As in the Cold War, 
challenges to this noble aim might have been met with the answer ‘and whatever is wrong 
with that?’ 
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